Introduction
Among monetary economists, a major topic of interest during recent years has been the possibility of a liquidity trap, i.e., a situation in which monetary policy stimulus cannot be obtained by the usual method of lowering the setting of the central bank's interest rate instrument because that rate is at its lower bound of zero. It would be better, I suggest, to use the term "zero lower bound situation," rather than "liquidity trap," since the latter seems to imply a priori that there is no available mechanism for generating monetary policy stimulus.
In any event, dozens of papers on the subject have appeared, including notable items by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , Wolman (1998) , Krugman (1998) , Reifschneider and Williams (1999) , McCallum (2000) , Goodfriend (2000) , Orphanides and Williams (2000) , Svensson (2001) , Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) , Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001) , Coenen and Wieland (2003) , Woodford (2003) , Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) , and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003, 2004) . Recent experiences in Japan have, of course, added intense concern from the practical perspective.
One of the more prominent results to come out of this literature is an irrelevance
proposition pertaining to open-market purchases, put forth by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , according to which "quantitative easing" is to no avail. Instead, "the key to effective central-bank action to combat a deflationary slump is the management of expectations" (2003, p. 8) . At face value, this proposition seems to contradict results by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) , Coenen and Wieland (2003) , and others who find a role for open market purchases of "unconventional" assets.
1 It will be argued below, however, that there is no actual theoretical inconsistency; that the different papers presume different types of policy experiments. 2 One crucial distinction is whether or not the policy experiment considered involves a change in the policy rule. If there is a credible rule change in an expansionary direction, then-as is shown below-monetary policy can be effective in bringing an economy out of a zero lower bound (ZLB) situation.
This last statement supposes, however, that the policy change in question is fully understood and believed so that a new rational expectations equilibrium becomes operative immediately. This, however, appears to be a highly dubious proposition. Accordingly, it would seem to be of some importance to consider how a central bank could regularly follow a policy rule that, if sustained, would keep the economy out of a ZLB situation automatically.
A major objective of the present paper is, accordingly, to develop one such rule. That task will be undertaken in Section 3, after Section 2 begins by expanding upon the topics just mentioned. Then in Sections 4 and 5 a small open economy model, based on optimizing behavior but with nominal price stickiness, will be specified and calibrated. Simulation results with this model and variants of our proposed policy rule are reported in Section 6, so as to explore the properties of the rule (which are found to be highly promising). Two relevant theoretical issues are discussed in Section 7 and a brief conclusion follows.
Alternative Policy Experiments
It is expositionally useful to begin with the policy experiment of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , henceforth referred to as E&W. It involves analysis of the stabilization properties of an interest rate policy regime that is specified to incorporate "quantitative easing." That term is taken by E&W (2003) to mean that the monetary base supply function, which supports (i.e., implements) their interest rate rule given money demand behavior, includes an unusual nonlinear component that calls for extra open market purchases whenever the interest rate is zero. These purchases are evidently reversed, however, as soon as the interest rate rises above zero. (The interest rate in question, denoted R t , is "the riskless nominal interest rate on one-period obligations…" (E&W 2003, p. 10) ) One could simply view this function as a base-money-supply policy rule, include the base money stock as a variable, and solve the model in a standard and familiar RE fashion, if it were not for the non-linear component and the restriction that the interest rate must be non-negative. 3 What E&W do with the resulting model is to show that the behavior of prices and output in the model's RE equilibrium is independent of the parameters that describe the quantitativeeasing component of the base supply rule. Whatever the extent of the additional base-money supply specified by this component, then, there will be no effect on inflation or output in the RE equilibrium. That is the E&W irrelevance proposition. Note, crucially, that it pertains to the nature of a single ongoing RE equilibrium for a given policy rule that involves certain specified behavior when the ZLB is operative, not to the adoption of a new rule. The irrelevance proposition is arguably not surprising, given that any "extra" base money supplied when R t = 0 is removed immediately as soon as R t > 0.
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The policy experiment considered by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) is quite different.
It begins with a policy rule in place, one that specifies a constantly growing level of the monetary base, and the economy in a ZLB situation with the interest rate R t equal to zero.
Then the authors postulate a change in the base money rule, either a one-time upward shift in the path of the base or an increase in its slope (the rate of growth of the base)-in either case a change that is sustained permanently. The experiment presumes a forseen upward jump in the natural real rate of interest after 5 periods that would bring the ZLB episode to an end in any event, but each of the two considered policy rule changes would have effects on the path of prices and possibly output in the interim. The increased base growth-rate policy also has the effect of bringing the ZLB episode with R t = 0 to an end sooner than would otherwise be the case. The Auerbach and Obstfeld results are of particular interest because the model utilized is in most respects similar to that of E&W.
In light of the foregoing discussion, I would suggest that the basic difference in outcomes is that the E&W experiment concerns the effects of an unusual design feature of one maintained policy rule whereas the Auerbach and Obstfeld experiment has to do with effects of a change from one policy rule to another. In one case the monetary rule utilizes an interest rate instrument and in the other case the monetary base, but it appears that this distinction is not crucial. As hinted above, E&W could utilize a policy rule specified as a base rule that includes an analogous quantitative easing component and develop a similar irrelevance result for that case. Furthermore, for a change in a monetary rule to be effective when an economy is in a ZLB situation, it is not necessary for the rule to be one that governs base quantities; it could as well be an interest rate rule that is altered.
For an extremely simple illustration of this last point, it will be sufficient to use a closed-economy model with full price flexibility. Consider the following two-equation system, which is so familiar as to require very little explanation at this point:
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(1)
Here y t and p t denote the logs of an output variable and the price level so ∆p t is inflation while R t is the one-period nominal interest rate. The term v t represents a preference shock that is generated by an exogenous stochastic process, which is assumed to be AR(1)-i.e., autoregressive of order one-with parameter ρ. Equation (2) is a Taylor-style rule in which the central bank is depicted as setting an interest rate instrument R t each period so as to tighten policy when inflation exceeds its target value π* and/or when output is high. In
(1)(2), y t should be interpreted as the output gap, y t − y t , with y t for simplicity assumed constant at the value zero. With flexible prices we then have y t = 0 in each period. Thus there are only two endogenous variables to be determined by the system, R t and ∆p t . This model should be understood to also include the requirement that ∆p t must not approach −∞ as t → ∞, because of a transversality condition that obtains in the underlying optimizing model.
To obtain a rational expectations (RE) solution, we first substitute out R t and using y t = 0 obtain
The minimum state variable (MSV) solution is of the form
implying E t ∆p t+1 = φ 0 + φ 1 ρv t . Then substitution into (3) and application of a standard undetermined coefficient procedure yields the requirement that
holds identically for all realizations of v t . That implies unique values for φ 0 and φ 1 and yields the MSV solution
Of course, Taylor (1993) and many others prescribe that the central bank set µ 0 = r, the longrun average real rate of interest, and we observe from (1) that this rate equals −b 0 /b 1 . So adherence to this recommendation implies that the second term on the right-hand side of (6) vanishes and we have ∆p t = π* − [b 1 (1−ρ+µ 1 )] -1 v t as the MSV solution for inflation.
Suppose, then, that an economy is of form (1)(2) except that it also includes the requirement that R t ≥ 0. Then (6) would be the RE solution if the parameter values and the distribution of v t were such that this inequality was never binding. But suppose that such is not the case and that the economy is in a ZLB situation with R t = 0. Next, suppose that in some period there is a policy change that amounts to an increase in the target inflation rate π* to a value high enough that the ZLB will never be effective in the future. Then the new RE equilibrium will yield immediately an inflation rate high enough to escape the ZLB situation.
By contrast, an increase in the value of the policy parameter µ 1 would in that situation have no necessarily constructive effect toward bringing the economy out of the ZLB. 6 This contrast is analogous to that of the Auerbach-Obstfeld and E&W results.
The simplicity and starkness of the foregoing example will probably lead many readers to object, to say something like "But that is totally implausible; the economy's agents would be very unlikely to know about, understand, and believe in the policy change even if 6 The solution for R t is R t = r + π* − [(1/b 1 )(1+µ 1 )/(1−ρ+µ 1 )]v t . Here the coefficient on v t is positive, but the direction of effect depends upon the sign of v t-1 . Furthermore, if ρ = 0, the magnitude of the coefficient is independent of µ 1 . Alternatively, one might ask whether an increased value of µ 1 would, with a sustained rule, help to prevent ZLB situations. The simulation results presented below suggest that the answer is "no," since larger values of µ 1 evidently imply (given other parameter values) increased variability of R t .
the central bank has every intention of carrying it out." With that objection I would entirely agree. More generally, many proponents of the hypothesis of rational expectations find it attractive mainly for consideration of alternative maintained policy rules, i.e., for application to situations prevailing after some time has passed (since any previous rule change) and the economy has settled into a new stochastic equilibrium. To these economists-e.g., Lucas (1980, p. 205) , Lucas and Sargent (1981, p. xxxvii) , Kydland and Prescott (1977) Williams (2000) and a few others have concentrated attention on rules for preventing a ZLB situation, rather than (or in addition to) schemes for escaping a ZLB "trap" in which an economy finds itself. In that spirit we move on to the discussion of a new rule proposal. 
A Rule for Use At or Away From the ZLB
Let us now turn to the main topic of the present paper, which is the development and exploration of a monetary policy rule that is appropriate for use at all times, whether or not short-term nominal interest rates are at their ZLB. 8 The very simple basic idea is to combine two component rules, designed for normal and ZLB conditions, by means of a weighted average of their respective instrument settings. The first of these two component rules could be written as a standard Taylor-type formulation as follows:
Here R t is a short-term nominal interest rate instrument and, for simplicity, we have entered 7 There is some interest in a policy of "helicopter drops," i.e., repeated gifts of money to the public, in contrast to monetary policy actions that involve only open-market actions by the central bank. A brief analysis is presented in Appendix A. 8 Obviously, if such a rule is in force during a ZLB episode, there is no need to devise an "exit strategy." the current value of inflation and the output gap as the variables to which the rule responds.
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In (7) π* is the target for inflation and r is the long-term average real rate of interest, while e t is a random policy shock that reflects unsystematic behavior by the monetary authority. We suppose that in normal times, when the ZLB on R t is not binding, the central bank wishes to utilize (7) as its monetary policy rule, so as to keep ∆p t close to π* and y t close to t y on average.
When R t is at its lower bound of zero, however, the central bank will be unable to respond as implied by (7) if the gap measures ∆p t − π* and y t − t y together call for a reduction in R t . In previous work, including McCallum (2000) and (2003), I have accordingly suggested a rule for adjusting the foreign exchange rate, s t in logarithmic terms, in such occasions. The version of this rule given in the more recent of these two papers is as follows:
(8) ∆s t = ∆q +∆p t − µ 1 (∆p t − π*) − µ 2 (y t − t y ) − e t , µ 1 , µ 2 ≥ 0.
Here we have minus signs on the two gap measures because an increase in the value of ∆s t − ∆p t represents a loosening, not a tightening, of monetary policy.
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Next we take a weighted average of the two preceding expressions, after changing the signs on all terms in (8). Let 1 − θ, with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, be the weight on the R t instrument. Then the resulting rule is as follows:
To facilitate understanding of the latter, first suppose that that the interest rate R t equals zero,
i.e., is at its ZLB. Then (9) becomes a rule for setting the value of the rate of exchange rate 9 It would be possible to use instead expected future values or lagged expectations of current values, etc.
depreciation, ∆s t . The formula might look a bit strange, but when R = 0, an implied steadystate relationship is r = −∆p. Then using the latter with (9) and rearranging we obtain
Clearly, the latter is of exactly the same form as the ∆s t rule (8), although it has a different numerical value for two of the response coefficients.
What about the interpretation of (9) when R t is not at the ZLB? To gain an intuitive idea regarding this case, suppose that the nominal exchange rate were to behave in conformity with the current inflation rate and the long run average rate of real exchange rate depreciation. Suppose, that is, that ∆s t = ∆p t + ∆q holds on a period-by-period basis. Then substitution into (9) yields
which has the form of a standard Taylor-type rule! So (9) works in a highly intuitive manner in both of these reference cases How would the composite rule (9) be implemented? To do so, the central bank would each period make purchases (or sales) in the money market or foreign exchange market-or preferably both-so as to adjust (1−θ)R t − θs t to the value indicated by (9), taking s t-1 as given. In this regard, note that buying money market securities tends to drive R t downward and s t upward, so both components of the weighted average [(1−θ)R t + θ(−∆s t )] ≡ MC t move in the same (downward) direction. Alternatively, buying foreign exchange would tend to drive s t upward and R t downward, so again both components move in the desired direction. 10 Here and in what follows S t = log -1 s t is the home country price of foreign exchange. Also, ∆q is the trend rate of growth of the real exchange rate minus the average inflation rate abroad.
Clearly, when instead a monetary tightening is desired, it would be possible to sell money market securities and/or foreign exchange, moving MC t in the upward direction.
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Since the rule is designed to be used at all times, operational procedures should be the same both at and away from the ZLB, so that market participants will understand that one rule is in effect. Accordingly, it would be desirable to have a secondary rule for determining what fraction of open market purchases will, during a given period, be made in the foreign exchange market. One possibility would be to have a fixed fraction, such as 0.25. (Note that this fraction does not need to equal θ, and probably should not.) Such an arrangement would imply that that the central bank would be making a large volume of purchases from the money market when at the ZLB, even though those purchases would not (in principle) have any effect on the value of MC t . Other rules that would increase the fraction as R t gets closer to zero would not have this latter property, but would be more difficult for market participants to understand.
It is likely that at this point many readers will have guessed the reason for using the symbol MC t to denote our composite measure. It is that this measure has some resemblance to a "monetary conditions index." The latter concept has been viewed rather unfavorably by most monetary economists in recent years, but that does not necessarily make it an undesirable policy indicator. It is my impression that the typical mode of presentation has made the concept appear to be dimensionally incoherent, 12 for most proponents have used written expressions such as (1−θ)R t − θs t , rather than (1−θ)R t + θ(−∆s t ).
13 But in such cases 11 Of course there are limits on a central bank's ability to increase MC t , since it will hold only finite stocks of foreign and domestic assets. 12 Thus I, for one, have been disturbed by the practice of taking a weighted average of two terms that have the units 1/years and yen/dollar, for example. But if the latter is expressed in rate of change form, as in (9), it too can have the units 1/years. 13 See, e.g., Ball (1999) , Gerlach and Smets (2000) , and the recent contribution by Detken and Gaspar (2003) .
the authors may actually have had in mind an exchange rate expressed in relation to some reference value, which leaves open the possibility that the dimensions of the two terms are in fact consistent. That is not to suggest that the numerical specifications of monetary conditions indexes considered or used by actual central banks have been ones that are well designed. In Section 6 below it will be argued that a very small weight-on the order of 0.025-should be attached to the exchange rate term, whereas personal experience tells me that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was at one time discussing a possible monetary conditions index with a weight close to 1 − 0.025 = 0.975, i.e., one almost 40 times as large.
In short, the present discussion is not intended to express approval of previous discussions of monetary condition indexes, but merely to acknowledge the extent of similarity between them and the policy rule (9) here under investigation.
Another matter that requires brief attention is the notion of interest rate smoothing, which is widely viewed as a practice much utilized by actual central banks. Can inertial behavior of R t be accommodated by rules such as (9)? Certainly there would be no analytical problem created by writing a partial adjustment equation for MC t , with the adjustment moving the actual value of MC t toward a value such as that on the right-hand side of (9).
Alternatively, one could apply smoothing only to the R t component, by writing (7) in a partial adjustment form before taking a weighted average of (7) and (8). 14 In this case the rule would be written as
which will be used below. Here (and in what follows) µ 3 is the interest rate smoothing parameter (0 < µ 3 < 1).
Model Specification
In order to explore the properties of a rule such as (9) or (9'), one needs to combine it with an appropriately specified model of an economy and then conduct analytical exercises to determine how the economy is predicted to perform with different variants of the rule. (12) is often combined with a log-linearized, per-household, overall resource constraint to yield an "expectational" or "optimizing" IS function. That step presumes that investment and capital are treated as exogenous. The simplest version of that assumption is that the capital stock is fixed; since endogenizing capital greatly complicates the analysis, the constant-capital specification will be used here.
For an open-economy extension, one might be tempted to write the economy's percapita resource constraint as y t = ω 1 c t + ω 2 g t + ω 3 x t -ω 4 im t , where y t , g t , x t , and im t are logarithms of real output, government consumption, exports, and imports with ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , and ω 4 representing steady-state shares of output for consumption, government purchases, exports, and imports. But if imports are exclusively material inputs to the production of home-country goods, and Y t = ln -1 y t is interpreted as units of output, not value added, then the relevant resource constraint is (13) y t = ω 1 c t + ω 2 g t + ω 3 x t .
For import demand to be modelled in an optimizing fashion, assume that output of consumer goods is effected by producers all with production functions of the same CES form, with labor and material imports being the two variable inputs. Then the costminimizing demand for imports is 15 (14) im t = y t − σq t + const.
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between materials and labor in production, and where "const." denotes some constant.
16 Also, q t is the log price of imports in terms of produced consumption goods. We will refer to Q t = ln -1 q t as the real exchange rate. Let P t and S t be the home country money price of goods and foreign exchange, with P t * the foreign money price of home-country imports. Then if p t , s t , and p t * are logs of these variables, we have (15) q t = s t -p t + p t *.
Symmetrically, we assume that export demand is given as (16) x t = y t * + σ*q t + const.
where y t * denotes income abroad and σ* is the price elasticity of demand from abroad for home-country goods.
Now consider output determination in a sticky-price version of the model. Taking a log-linear approximation to the home-country production function, we have y t = α 1 a t + α 1 n t + α 2 im t + const., where n t and a t are logs of labor input and a labor-augmenting technology shock term, respectively. For simplicity suppose that labor supply is inelastic, with 1.0 units supplied per period by each household. Thus with full price flexibility we would have n t = 0 and the 15 In the model used below there is also a small adjustment included for the effects of imperfect competition. 16 That is, the expressions "const." in different equations appearing below will typically refer to different constant magnitudes. But while t y would be the economy's output in period t if prices could adjust promptly, we assume that prices adjust only sluggishly. Then if the economy's demand quantity as determined by the rest of the system differs from t y , the former quantity y t prevails-with workers departing from their (inelastic) supply schedules so as to provide whatever quantity is needed to produce the demanded output, with im t given by (14).
In such a setting, the precise way in which prices adjust has a direct impact on demand and consequently on production. There are various models of gradual price adjustment utilized in the recent literature that are intended to represent optimizing behavior in the context of nominal adjustment costs. In the analysis that follows, I will use (18) ∆p t = (1+β) -1 (βE t ∆p t+1 + ∆p t-1 ) + κ(y t − y t ) + u t , κ > 0 where β is a discount factor and u t is a behavioral disturbance. This form of equation has been fairly prominent, 17 primarily because it tends to impart a more realistic degree of inflation persistence than does the Calvo-Rotemberg model (which is theoretically more attractive). For an extensive discussion of relevant issues, see Woodford (2003) .
A standard feature of most open-economy models is a relation implying uncovered interest parity (UIP). Despite its prominent empirical weaknesses, accordingly, the basic M&N model incorporates one:
(19) R t -R t * = E t ∆s t+1 + ξ t .
We include a time-varying "risk premium" term ξ t , however, that may have a sizeable variance and may be autocorrelated.
In previous applications of this model it has been assumed, as in most recent research in monetary economics, that the monetary authority conducts policy by adjusting a oneperiod nominal interest rate in response to prevailing (or forecasted future) values of inflation and the output gap, ỹ t = y t − t y , as in (7) above. For present purposes, however, we will be using the rule (9'), now written as
of which (7)-possibly with smoothing-is a special case when θ = 0.
To complete the model, we need only to include the Fisher identity, (1 + r t ) =
(1 + R t ) / (1 + E t ∆p t+1 ), which we approximate in the familiar fashion:
(21) r t = R t − E t ∆p t+1 .
Thus we have a simple log-linear system in which the ten structural relations (12)- (21) determine values for the endogenous variables y t , t y , ∆p t , r t , R t , q t , s t , c t , x t , and im t .
Government spending g t and the foreign variables p t *, y t *, R t * are taken to be exogenous-as are the shock processes for v t , a t , e t , and ξ t .
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One might note parenthetically a few features of the model. First, it would be possible to append a money demand function such as (22) m t -p t = γ 0 + γ 1 y t + γ 2 R t + η t ,
17 See Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , Gali and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003) . M&N assumed that each period-t utility term includes C t /(C t-1 ) h , with 0 ≤ h < 1, rather than C t alone. That specification gives rise to the following replacement for (12):
(25) c t = h 0 + h 1 c t-1 + h 2 E t c t+1 + h 3 E t c t+2 + h 4 (log λ t ) + v t .
In the latter, λ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint, which obeys (26) log λ t = const. + E t log λ t+1 + r t , and there are constraints relating the h j parameters to others in the system. 20 Inclusion of this feature results in a model in which there is somewhat more persistence in consumption and output fluctuations than with the basic formulation. In the present study, accordingly, I
have again included this habit-formation modification in the base-case model.
Calibration and Model Properties
Calibration of the model draws on M&N (1999) but differs in several ways that are appropriate for present purposes. For the parameter governing spending behavior, I retain here the h = 0.8 value taken from an early version of Fuhrer (2000), but for my base case have adopted the assumption that γ, the counterpart of −b 1 in (1), equals 0.5 rather than 1/6, in order to reflect the greater responsiveness of investment spending (since the latter is not included explicitly in the model). 21 For σ, the elasticity of substitution in production (and therefore the elasticity of import demand with respect to Q t ), I now use 0.6 (instead of 0.333) 20 For details and additional discussion, see M&N (1999a), Amato and Laubach (2004) , and the basic study by Fuhrer (2002) . 21 The parameter in question, γ, is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption when h = 0.
so that, with the same absolute value used for the elasticity of export demand with respect to Q t , the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied. In (6), the imported inputs share parameter α 2 is taken to equal ω 3 , the share of exports in domestic production. The steady state value of this share of imports (and exports) to domestic production is taken to be 0.15 in our base case, and can be altered to represent differing degrees of openness. For the base-case share of government consumption I take ω 2 = 0.2. Finally, in the price adjustment relation the specification is that κ = 0.03. The latter value is based on my reading of a wide variety of studies, plus conversion into non-annualized fractional terms for a quarterly model. Also, quasi-realistic parameters for a Taylor-style interest rate policy rule will be specified as µ 1 = 0.5, µ 2 = 0.5, and µ 3 = 0.8, the latter reflecting considerable interest rate smoothing. Below I refer to these as "standard" values, but also include cases with other values for µ 1 and µ 3 .
The stochastic processes driving the model's shocks must also be calibrated, of course. For both foreign output and the technology shock, I have specified AR (1) Before using the foregoing model to discuss the policy rule (20) Also revealing are properties of impulse response functions. In that regard, Figure 1 reports the responses of six model variables to a unit shock in the monetary policy rule for the reference case just described. Since that type of shock is an unexpected upward blip in the interest rate instrument, R t , it represents an unsystematic and unexpected tightening in monetary policy. Figure 1 indicates that such an event would induce a fall in output that is gradually eliminated, a fall in the inflation rate that returns smoothly to its original level over a number of periods (quarters), a sharp appreciation in nominal and real exchange rates, and an increase in net exports. These are all responses that accord with economists' standard understanding of the effects of an unexpected tightening of monetary policy. Next, in Figure   2 , we depict the impulses in response to a positive disturbance in the IS function, i.e., an increase in consumers' desire to consume in the present (relative to the future). In this case, both output and inflation rise and only gradually return to their original values. The nominal interest rate rises, as governed by the policy rule, to help to stabilize these movements in output and inflation. The real exchange rate appreciates and only slowly returns to its original level. Also, net exports fall, as a result of the increased income levels that imply an increased magnitude of import demand.
In Figure 3 , we find responses to a positive technology shock. Real income increases and returns to its initial level only very slowly, since the shock is highly persistent-close to a random walk. Inflation falls slightly, and monetary policy lets the one-period interest rate fall in order to stabilize inflation-to which it responds more strongly than output. The trade balance deteriorates, since import demand is boosted by the increased level of income, and the real exchange value of domestic goods falls, since they are relatively cheaper to produce than before the shock. Finally, in Figure 4 we depict a shock to uncovered interest parity, i.e., an unexpected and unsystematic exogenous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
Since prices are sticky, this translates into an unexpected depreciation also in the real exchange rate. That induces an increase in net exports and therefore an increase in domestic output, with a very small rise in inflation.
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In sum, the responses in 
Simulation Results
The objective now is to presents results, based on analysis of the model just described, illustrating the properties of the MC equation (20) as a monetary policy rule.
Ideally, one would like to conduct this analysis with an extended version of the model that includes the nonlinear constraint R t ≥ 0. At present I do not have the necessary computational resources to proceed in this fashion, so only linear-model results will be reported below. They seem to be sufficient, however, to make the two essential points.
These are as follows:
24 Note parenthetically that this type of response does not reflect how net exports would behave in response to a change in the monetary policy rule. McCallum (2003) estimates that an increase in the inflation target rate, intended to be permanent, would induce a decrease in net exports (the opposite of a "beggar-thy-neighbor effect).
(i) Under conditions implying that monetary policy via an interest rate rule would be immobilized by the ZLB constraint, the MC rule will provide policy actions that are strongly stabilizing.
(ii) Under conditions such that the ZLB constraint is not relevant, the MC rule would not significantly-if at all-hinder monetary policy.
Together, these two points appear to establish the potential desirability of the MC rule (20).
To develop point (i), the procedure is to conduct simulations in which (20) is the policy rule and the interest rate R t is held fixed at a constant value. For this to be done, one of the structural equations of the model must as a computational matter be eliminated. As in
McCallum (2000), the one chosen is the UIP condition (19). As in that previous case, however, the actual conceptual step is not the elimination of UIP but instead its extension to a more general condition, involving some element of the "portfolio balance" theory, together with recognition that it is operationally redundant. 25 (Discussion is provided below.) The relevant simulation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . In the first of these the policy parameters µ 2 and µ 3 are held fixed at the values 0.5 and 0.8, respectively, so that the results are comparable to those in the upper cell row of Table 1 . With θ = 1, as in the first cell row of Table 2 , the MC rule is simply a rule for setting the rate of depreciation (or appreciation)
of the exchange rate. The figures in this cell row indicate that with µ 1 at the "realistic" value of 0.5, both inflation and the output gap are excessively variable (in relation to actuality and to the comparable values in Table 1 ). But the entries in the first cell row of Table 2 also show clearly that inflation is effectively stabilized by moving to increased (more aggressive) values of µ 1 , a result implying that effective stabilization can be provided by the exchange rate rule. Crucially, use of smaller values for θ in the rule have effects that, when R t = 0, are in some respects similar to those from adoption of larger µ 1 magnitudes. Thus while keeping µ 1 = 0.5 we look with interest to the other cell rows in Table 2 , where smaller θ values are specified, and find much improved performance. With θ = 0.1, for example, the SD values for inflation and the output gap are reduced to magnitudes close to those in the second column of Table 1 . In fact, with θ = 0.025, the MC rule SD values with µ 1 = 0.5 dominate 26 those in Table 1 . The same is true, moreover, for µ 1 = 0.05. With large values of µ 1 , however, small θ settings have the effect of making ∆s t excessively responsive to fluctuations in inflation and the output gap, leading to large SD values for this instrument variable.
The foregoing comparisons are all based on the assumption that µ 3 = 0.8, i.e., that there is considerable smoothing of short-term interest rates. 27 The results for the case with interest rate smoothing (µ 3 = 0.8) are shown in Table 4 . These are to be compared with the SD values in the top cell row of Table 1 , which are for the standard interest rate rule with smoothing.
Consider column two, with the realistic value of 0.5 for µ 1 . With θ = 1.0, we have the case in which the MC rule amounts to a pure exchange-rate rule and we find that variability of inflation and the output gap is distinctly higher than in Table 1 for the same µ 1 value. But if we set θ = 0.1, as in row two of Table 4 , the MC results improve sharply and would no longer be considered to be significantly worse, relative to the case with a pure R t rule. So this result tends to establish the point at hand, that serious deterioration is not induced by use of the MC rule when it is unnecessary. Furthermore, the results are better even than that, for with θ = 0.025, the SD values from rule (20) are as low or lower (than in Table 1 ) for all four variables. Thus the MC rule is unambiguously more effective than the R t rule in this particular case, even without taking any account of the former's crucial advantage, namely, to be usable in cases in which the ZLB constraint is in effect.
28
Analogous results are presented in Table 5 under the assumption that µ 3 = 0, rather than µ 3 = 0.8. The conclusions are much the same. With respect to the results in both Tables   4 and 5 it must be recognized that comparisons that do not impose any ZLB constraint are not the same as the ones that would be fully appropriate theoretically, i.e., comparisons of the 26 I.e., are all smaller than. 27 The outcomes are, accordingly, more favorable than if the possibility of a ZLB were correctly recognized (i.e., the constraint R t ≥ 0 was actually imposed). But in light of (i), the outcomes reported are relatively more favorable for the reference case with θ = 0 and so our conclusion is conservative (i.e., the error works against our conclusion).
R t and MC rules with solutions that have the ZLB constraint binding occasionally. But it would appear that the comparison being made is conservative (in the sense of working against our argument) since there is less weight assigned to the interest rate component by the MC rule than with the reference case, and this component's stabilizing power should actually be excluded.
The main findings presented to this point are that the MC rule does provide effective stabilization even with R t at the ZLB and that the MC rule can perform at least nearly as well as the R t rule when the ZLB is irrelevant. There are many ways in which one would like to check the robustness of these findings with respect to alterations in the model utilized. One that will be considered here is to introduce a somewhat more realistic assumption with respect to information available to the model's monetary policy makers. In particular, it will be assumed that the central bank cannot observe current values of inflation and the output gap when choosing instrument settings for the current period. In rule (20) , that is, E t-1 ∆p t and E t-1 ỹ t will be used in place of actual values of ∆p t and ỹ t . Results are shown in Table 6 , all based on the policy-rule parameter values µ 1 = 0.5, µ 2 = 0.5, and µ 3 = 0.8. In the first column we find SD values under the assumption that the ZLB is irrelevant. The pure interest rate rule case appears in the last cell row (θ = 0), and the other rows show that with small values of θ there is no substantial deterioration in performance from use of the MC rule (20). Then in column two we have results for the case in which the ZLB condition R t = 0 is imposed.
Here again we see that the MC rule is effective, in the sense that SD values for inflation and the output gap are reduced as the specified value of θ is decreased, despite the assumed immobilization of the interest rate.
28 A caveat should be mentioned, namely, that the results of our simulations are subject to sampling error.
The one other model modification that is explored in the present paper concerns the economy's openness, as measured by ω 3 , the average share of output that is exported (and imported). In the simulations for Table 6 , this share is doubled to 0.30. The results reported in columns three and four are analogous to those in columns one and two. And again they are supportive of the suggestion that the MC rule (20) could be useful in improving macroeconomic performance for an economy that has some danger of a ZLB constraint arising.
Analytical Issues
There are a few theoretical issues, bypassed in the foregoing presentation, that need to be discussed. The first of these has to do with the "elimination" of the UIP condition (19) Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) . In a series of papers, these authors have suggested that a ZLB situation could arise for reasons quite different from those presumed above. In our analysis, as in that of Krugman (1998) , Eggertsson amd Woodford (2003 , Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004) , Coenen and Wieland (2003) , and most other writers on the ZLB issue, it is assumed that the relevant RE solution is one in which inflation fluctuates around the target value specified by the usual interest rate policy rule. If the target inflation rate plus the steady state real rate of interest is a moderately high value, such as 4-5 percent per year, unusually large shocks would be required to push the system to the vicinity of the ZLB. By contrast, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe suggest that there are multiple RE equilibria and the relevant one may instead be located at the ZLB value of R t , even in the absence of shocks. My position, argued most extensively in
McCallum (2002), is that this ZLB equilibrium is not plausible, because it fails to be E-stable in the sense developed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Such a failure implies that this (apparent) RE equilibrium would not be learnable in a setting that recognizes that individual are not miraculously endowed with knowledge of the economy's parameters, but need to learn about them over time by observation of the economy's behavior. The usual RE equilibrium, focused upon by the other papers mentioned above, is by contrast E-stable and learnable under standard assumptions. On the basis of this contrast, I would argue that the usual RE equilibrium is the only one of these two that is plausible as a description of the behavior of an actual economy.
Conclusions
Let us close with a brief summary of the paper's arguments. It begins by emphasizing the difference between policy rule changes, intended to help escape an existing ZLB situation, and maintained policy rules designed so as to avoid the "liquidity trap"
aspects of a ZLB situation. Analysis assuming that rule changes would be quickly recognized, understood, and believed-so that a new RE equilibrium would be relevant immediately-seems implausible. Accordingly, the paper focuses not on policy changes for escaping a liquidity trap, but on the design of a policy rule that should retain stabilization effectiveness for monetary policy even if the economy is temporarily shocked into a situation in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates makes demand stimulation via interest rate reductions infeasible.
The particular policy rule considered in detail is one that uses as its instrument or indicator variable a weighted average of the usual short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. With a small weight attached to the depreciation term, inclusion of the latter would be nearly irrelevant in normal situations. But when the ZLB condition R t = 0 prevails, then adjustments in the weighted average-which has some similarities to a monetary conditions index-require large movements in the depreciation rate (effected by central bank purchases of foreign exchange). These would affect aggregate demand by another channel, and would provide stabilization power-with no need for any additional exit strategy.
Stabilizing properties of this MC rule are studied by means of stochastic simulations with a model of a small open economy developed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) . The latter differs from other small-scale models based on optimizing behavior (but with sticky prices) by treating imports as inputs to the economy's production processes, rather than as consumer goods. The simulations indicate that: (i) under conditions implying that monetary policy via an interest rate rule would be immobilized by the ZLB constraint, the MC rule would provide strong stabilizing policy actions; yet (ii) under conditions such that the ZLB constraint is not relevant, the MC rule would not significantly-if at all-hinder monetary policy. Together, these two sets of results are supportive of the idea that a monetary policy of the MC type could be useful for an economy with a low target inflation rate. 
